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INFORMATION MAY WANT TO BE FREE,
BUT INFORMATION PRODUCTS DO NOT:
PROTECTING AND FACILITATING TRANSACTIONS
IN INFORMATION PRODUCTS
Kristen Osenga*

ABSTRACT

Information products-products that are used to organize, provide
context, and distribute information-have gone largely unprotected by
intellectual property regimes. As a result, producers of information
products, such as databases and software, have resorted to alternative
mechanisms to protect their investments. These mechanisms have
resulted in both over-protection and under-protection of the information
products. Further, the uncertainty in the boundaries of coverage,
coupled with the resort to self-help mechanisms, may well inhibit,
rather than facilitate, information flow. What is needed is a sui generis
protection scheme for information products that clearly defines the
boundaries and protection requirements for these works and that
provides an appropriate level ofprotection, based in part on a liabilitytype regime, to both promote creation of information products and
encourage transactions in these works. By protecting the investments of
information product creators, while still allowing or even facilitating
the free flow of information, it is possible to take a nuanced approach
that capitalizes on the best of both intellectual property and alternative
regimes. Information may want to be free, but information products do
not.
* Associate Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. I would like to specifically
thank Justin Hughes, Tom Cotter, Jay Kesan, Jim Gibson, and Corinna Lain for their thoughtful
and detailed comments on this paper. I am also grateful to the participants at the George
Washington/Software & Information Industry Association conference "Feist, Facts, and Function:
IP Protection for Works Beyond Entertainment;" the Intellectual Property Scholars Conference at
DePaul University College of Law; the Intellectual Property & Communications Law and Policy
Scholars Roundtable at Michigan State University College of Law; the Southeastern Association
of Law Schools annual meeting; and Faculty Colloquia at the University of Emory School of Law
and the University of Richmond School of Law for their comments at the earlier stages of this
Article. Finally, I appreciate the excellent research assistance provided by Jennifer Jones.
Comments are welcome at kosenga@richmond.edu.
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INTRODUCTION

Information is "the oxygen of the modem age." 1 Despite its
importance, or perhaps because of it, conventional wisdom has long
been of the view that information wants to, or even needs to, be free.
This idea has been extended to encompass not just raw data, but also
information products such as databases and software. These productsproducts whose primary value lies in organizing, providing context, and
distributing information content2-have often been the subject of debate
over whether and to what extent they should be protected. The tension
between information being free and information products being
protected is particularly acute in our technological society, where
computers and the internet have made the collection, storage,
management, delivery, reproduction, and transfer of enormous
quantities of data as simple as clicking a mouse button or typing a
keystroke) Even print compilations of information can be easily
transformed into digital format using today's technology. 4
Yet while the combination of ever-improving technology and everincreasing access to and availability of information creates low barriers
to entry into the information product market, it also facilitates
misappropriation of these works. It is natural for creators of these
goods to seek some form of protection to inhibit misappropriation and
allow recoupment of investments made in the creation of these
information products. 5 For the most part though, traditional intellectual
I Harold Jackson, Eyewitness: The Medium Is Massaged, GUARDIAN, June 14, 1989
(quoting Ronald Reagan). In less dramatic fashion, information has also been called "one of the
nation's most critical economic resources." Peter K. Yu, The Political Economy of Data
83
CHI.-KENT
L.
REV.
(forthcoming
2008),
available
at
Protection,
www .ssm.corn/abstract=' I 04678 I (quoting INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE,
NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE AGENDA FOR ACTION 7 (1993)). See also JAMES
BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE
INFORMATION SOCIETY 2 (I 996).
2 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Information Products: A Challenge to Intellectual Property
Theory, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 897,897 (1988) (defining "information products" as "items
like computer technology (including software programs and computerized databases), 'designer
genes' and semiconductors: products whose information content vastly exceeds in value the cost
of the products on which that information is stored" (footnote omitted)).
3 See J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND.
L. REV. 51, 64-65 (I 997).
4 See id. at 67. As true as this statement was in 1997, in the decade that has passed since
Reichman and Samuelson published their article, the advances in technology have increased
exponentially.
5 See, e.g., SOFTWARE & INFO. INDUS. ASS'N, SOFTWARE AND INFORMATION: DRIVING THE
GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY I I (2008), available at http://www.siia.net/estore/globecon08.pdf. The Software & Information Industry Association (SIIA), the "principal trade association
for the software and digital content industry," states that "[t]he U.S. software and information
sectors depend on a meaningful international framework for the protection of [its] industry's
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property law has failed to provide this protection. Copyright law
specifically prohibits protection of ideas and facts; patent law, while not
particularly excluding information products, has been generally, and
increasingly, held by the courts to not extend to these works. To fill the
void left by intellectual property law, producers of information products
have resorted to other legal and non-legal mechanisms to prevent
misappropriation of their works.
These alternative constraints,
however, shift the decisions of access and control to private parties who
may not honor public welfare goals of intellectual property law, such as
disclosure and fair use. 6 As a result, instead of information qua
information products being free, it is often effectively more propertized
than it would have been under a traditional intellectual property scheme.
Although protection for information products was debated long
before these products were widely electronic, the issue has taken on
renewed importance as information products become increasingly
ubiquitous. The primary argument advanced by proponents in this
debate is that protection is necessary to provide incentives to a creator
to produce the protected work. 7 The exclusive rights provided by most
protection schemes afford the creator an artificial lead-time to exploit
his creation and potentially recoup costs sunk into developing the
product. Proponents argue that information products, maybe more so
than other works, require some grant of exclusivity to support optimal
creation. This is necessary because the costs of developing an
information product are typically front-loaded and the costs of
appropriating, duplicating, and transmitting an existent information
product are typically low. On the other hand, there are two main
arguments advanced by those opposed to protection: first, information
has to be free; and second, even in an environment of uncertain
protection, information products are being produced. As to the first,
most information is presumptively free for use so long as it is acquired
fairly.s Information is often considered to be part of the public domain,
intellectual property." See id. at 2, 39.
6 See Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management
Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41,51 (2001).
7 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law,
75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 993 (1997) ("Intellectual property is fundamentally about incentives to
invent and create. While there are a number of noneconomic theories offered to explain both
copyright and patent law, both the United States Constitution and judicial decisions seem to
acknowledge the primacy of incentive theory in justifying intellectual property." (footnotes
omitted)); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic philosophy behind the
clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement
of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents
of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts."').
8 See Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Information as Speech, Information as Goods: Some
Thoughts on Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 665, 665 ( 1992). In
fact, limitations on the use of information oftentimes must overcome the extraordinary protection
provided by the First Amendment. See id. There are, of course, certain types of information that
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free for anyone to access and use, and further considered to be "the
building block of knowledge" and "a cardinal element in securing
As to the second,
competition in a free market economy."9
commentators opposed to protection for information products argue that
it is speculative, at best, to presume that creators of these works require
such incentive. IO
Regardless of the merits of the debate, up to now, the decision has
been seen as binary-either there should be protection or there should
not be. This simplistic view, however, neglects an important facet of
reality: the absence of protection does not guarantee that information
will be free. In fact, evidence suggests that information products are
routinely covered by other, more onerous, protection mechanisms that
prohibit uses of information that traditional intellectual property
protection would permit. 11 The fact that producers of these works are
relying on alternative protection schemes removes much credibility
from the second oppositional argument discussed above; that
information products may be flourishing in the absence of intellectual
property protection is not the same as flourishing in the absence of any
protection. The incentive to produce these works is instead found in
whatever other protective means the creators can wrangle to obtain at
least the perception of exclusivity, but these alternate means lack the
oversight and safety valves that can be implemented in an intellectual
property scheme.12
This scheme of incomplete protection under intellectual property
laws and potential over-reaching protection under a patchwork quilt of
alternate means leads to a system with unclearly defined coverage and
rights. In tum, this further hampers the flow of information because the
increased protection obtained by the creator comes at the expense of
have not been granted unfettered freedom-blackmail, fraud, petjury, espionage, and the like.
9 See Miriam Bitton, A New Outlook on the Economic Dimension of the Database Protection
Debate, 47 IDEA 93, 100-01 (2006).
10 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents on DNA Sequences: Molecules and Information, in THE
COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION 417, 430 (Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil Weinstock Netanel,
eds. 2002); see also, Bitton, supra note 9, at 119 (noting that those opposed to protection point to
the great number of information products, and specifically databases, being produced between the
1980s and today in the general absence of protection). However, this point may be overstated,
particularly with respect to databases. Because many databases have been traditionally produced
by single sources and the markets for these databases will not support multiple sources, it is
unlikely the effects of market failure due to lack of protection will be seen. See id. at 121.
II See, e.g., Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003); ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); Jacqueline Lipton, Information Property: Rights and
Responsibilities, 56 FLA. L. REV. 135, 144 (2004).
I2 See Justin Hughes, How Extra-Copyright Protection of Databases Can be Constitutional,
28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 159,202 (2002) (noting that "it is possible that promulgation of a database
protection law will actually retard the rise of legal and technological self-help" and that "the
exceptions and exemptions from a database protection law could prove more important than the
protection itself'). See generally Jacqueline Lipton, Balancing Private Rights and Public
Policies: Reconceptualizing Property in Databases, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 773 (2003).
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increased transaction costs for disseminating the work 13 and difficulties
in negotiating access and use ofthe information products. 14
What is needed is a different approach, one that appreciates the
value added to raw information when it is included in an information
product while preserving, and perhaps enhancing, the free flow of the
information itself. This scheme needs to provide a well-defined system
of rights in information products to both encourage creation of these
works and facilitate transactions related to access and use of the
products, and yet be flexible enough to ensure that innovation is not
stifled because the necessary information has become propertized. The
proposal outlined below considers information products that have both
information components that typically remove these works from
protection and structural components that add value to the information
components by organizing the data, providing context to the data, and
facilitating distribution of the data in a useful fashion. 15 The proposed
scheme uses these components to clearly define the boundaries of the
works and protection, as well as requirements for and appropriate levels
of protection for these works.
Part I discusses the current state of protection available for
information products under the traditional intellectual property regimes
of patent and copyright law. I conclude that neither of these systems
sufficiently covers information products; indeed, these laws expressly
exclude most of these works from protection. Part II describes
alternative protection schemes that have been applied to information
products in the absence of intellectual property protection, ranging from
non-intellectual-property legal schemes to alternative non-legal
mechanisms, as well as a number of legislative and academic proposals
directed towards the protection of information products. I critique the
inability of these means to provide adequate protection without overreaching. Part III explains the advantages of providing protection for
information products and proposes a sui generis protection scheme that
addresses the concerns previously discussed while still permitting a
13 See Norman Siebrasse, A Property Rights Theory of the Limits of Copyright, 51 U.
TORONTO L.J. I, 10-11 (200 I) ("Since creators have an incentive to use the most efficient form of
protection available, and denying copyright protection reduces the available options, the licensing
costs of the alternatives [such as contract or trade secret] will be equal to or higher than those
associated with the copyright protection they replace.").
14 See id. at 56-57 ("Objective uncertainty in the law implies a greater likelihood in large
differences between subjective valuations of the [right the creator can assign] and a concomitant
increase in the probability of bargaining breakdown.").
15 It needs to be clear at the outset that the structural component of the information products
covered by the proposed scheme is integral to the product itself. For example, an audio CD or a
video DVD is arguably an information product, consisting of the information component (the
audio or video itself) and the structural component (the media). However, the structural
component is not integral to the information product, but is simply the delivery mechanism;
contrast a database, where the field structures and other components themselves fundamentally
add value to the information component.
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creator of information products to reap some benefits for his investment
in the works. The resulting scheme avoids over-reaching and allows for
inclusion of safety valves and oversight. Further, by clarifying the
boundaries of protection and implementing a liability-type regime, the
scheme facilitates transactions in information products and may actually
promote the free flow of information.

I.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COVERAGE FOR INFORMATION PRODUCTS
IS INSUFFICIENT

Although the debate about whether information products should be
protected remains, reviewing the current state of protection for these
works demonstrates that a new scheme is required to avoid overprotection and prevent the inhibition of information flow. Quite
naturally, the first sources to examine for the protection for new,
innovative, or creative works are the traditional intellectual property
regimes-namely patent law and copyright law. 16 Neither of these
regimes, however, provides adequate coverage for information products
and, in fact, they actually exclude many of these works from protection
in whole or in part.

A.

Patent Law

A patent provides an inventor an exclusive right over his invention
for a period of twenty years from the filing of an application for
patent_I? For a patent to be granted, the patent application must describe
a new, useful, and non-obvious invention in sufficient detail to permit a
person of ordinary skill in the art to practice the invention based on that
description. 18 Patents are granted on a wide range of inventions, and
statutory subject matter for patenting includes processes, machines,

16 Trademark law, although a traditional intellectual property regime, is not a viable source of
protection for information products for at least two reasons. First, trademarks are an unusual type
of intellectual property because the express purpose of a trademark is to convey information. See,
e.g., Stacy L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fait
Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 467 (2005) ("Trademark law ... aims to promote more
competitive markets by improving the quality of information in those markets."). Second, the
information products contemplated by this Article are unlikely to qualify for trademark
protection, as a trademark is defined as "any word, name, symbol, or device" that is used "to
identify and distinguish" goods and "to indicate the source of the goods." 15 U.S.C. § 1127
(2006).
17 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2006).
18 The requirements for patentability of an invention are provided by 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102,
I 03, and 112 (2006).
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manufactures, and compositions of matter. 19 While these categories are
generally broad enough to cover nearly every imaginable invention,
there are three judicially-created exceptions to works that otherwise fall
into these categories. 20 Specifically, abstract ideas, laws of nature, and
natural phenomena, the collection of which has been referred to as
"fundamental principles," may not be patented. 21 Although neither the
statutory provisions nor the interpreting case law explicitly excludes
information, 22 information products have been barred from protection
under patent law based on a number of theories.
First, some information products, such as databases, do not fit
comfortably within any of the enumerated statutory categories (process,
machine, manufacture, or article of composition). While the machine
and composition of matter categories are clearly inapplicable, the
process and manufacture categories seem at least plausible for
information products. However, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit has recently reinterpreted the statutory category "process" to
require the method to be tied to a particular machine or to transform a
particular article from one state or thing to another_23 This redefinition
has two potential impacts on information products. The first impact is
that the court specifically left open the issue of whether the recitation of
a computer is sufficient to tie a computer-based method to a particular
machine to satisfy the first prong, calling into question the patentability
of software. 24 The second impact is that the court reigned in what sort
of data is eligible for transformation in the second prong. Here, the
court grappled with the idea of transformation of non-physical objects,
which may be implicated in information products. 25 The inputs and
outputs of information products are often electronic data or abstract
concepts, which the court indicates may fail the transformation prong of
the test for subject matter eligibility unless the data is representative of a
physical object. 26
With respect to the manufacture category,
information products may encounter another hurdle. Case law has long
excepted information products from patent protection under the "printed
35 u.s.c. § 101.
See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
21 See id.
22 See Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 419.
23 See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en bane).
24 The Bilski opinion was specifically directed to a business method that did not require a
computer, as opposed to software. However, numerous amici urged the court to consider
software at the same time. The court declined to address the issue, but did indicate that simply
reciting that the process be performed by a computer will not necessarily yield a statutorily
protectable process. See id. at 962 (leaving to future cases to elaborate "whether or when
recitation of a computer suffices" to tie a method to a particular machine).
25 See id. at 962-63.
26 See id. The court indicates that the transformation "must be central to the purpose of the
claimed process" and that the transformation must be of a physical object or substance, or of an
electronic signal representative of any physical object or substance. See id. at 962.
19

20
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matter doctrine," which excludes printed articles from patent
eligibility. 27 The printed matter doctrine has been updated for today's
technology to prohibit patenting of storage media including information
(where the stored information represents the only new or inventive
portion). 28
Second, even if the information product falls within one of the four
statutory categories, it may fall within one of the judicially-created
exceptions to patent eligible subject matter-abstract idea, law of
nature, and natural phenomena. For example, in early case law,
software was denied patent protection because courts considered the
invention to be simply an abstract idea. 29 At other times, because the
software included an algorithm or equation that described the natural
world, the work was held to be unpatentable because it fell within the
law of nature exception.3° In the last few decades, it had been
understood that software inventions were eligible for patenting, but
recent administrative and legal decisions indicate that these works may
again be considered to fall within the judicial exceptions of fundamental
principles. 31
Third, there is a policy argument against the patenting of
information. Patents are granted on the basis of a bargain between the
patentee and the public, granting the inventor a limited-time
exclusionary right in a tangible application of an invention in exchange
for free disclosure of information to the public about the invention.3 2 In
the case of information products, because the work often does not
provide any new disclosure to the public, the patent bargain is one-

27 See, e.g., In re Sterling, 70 F.2d 910, 912 (C.C.P.A. 1934) (holding that a checkbook
including both checking and savings stubs was not patentable because "the mere arrangement of
printed matter on a sheet or sheets of paper does not constitute patentable subject matter").
28 See, e.g., In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Linn, J., dissenting in part)
(noting that "if the only distinction between a prior art storage medium and a claimed storage
medium is the information stored thereon ... then the claimed storage medium (with associated
information) is" not patentable, either under 35 U.S.C. § 101 or 35 U.S.C. § 103 (citing In re
Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381, 1387 (Fed. Cir. 1983))).
29 See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
30 See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
31 I have written elsewhere about the unfortunate revival of abstract idea rejections of
software inventions. See Kristen Osenga, Ants, Elephant Guns, and Statutory Subject Matter, 39
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1087 (2007). The recent Bilski case, discussed above, confirms my concern.
There, the court reiterates the applicability of the fundamental principles exclusion from statutory
subject matter, which is not troublesome, but seems to tie it to the machine-or-transformation test
for a statutory process, which is troublesome. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 960-61 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
("[W]e ... recognized that the Supreme Court has held that mental processes, like fundamental
principles, are excluded by§ 101 because phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental
processes, and abstract intellectual concepts ... are the basic tools of scientific and technological
work. ... Because [the claims at issue] failed the machine-or-transformation test, we held that
they were drawn solely to a fundamental principle ... and were thus not patent-eligible under §
101." (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
32 See Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 425.
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sided; the patentee gets the exclusionary right but the public does not
get additional disclosure. 33
Thus, at best, patent protection for
information products is incomplete and uncertain; at worst, patent
protection for information products simply does not exist and is
considered inappropriate.
B.

Copyright Law

Protection under copyright law grants exclusive rights to creators
of original expressive works. 34 The rights generally attach when the
work is created and last for a period of the life of the author plus
seventy years. 35 Prior to the early 1990s, information products were
presumed to be covered by copyright law; however, copyright
protection is now generally unavailable for information products for
many reasons.36 First, although the list of statutory categories of works
for which copyright protection is available is fairly extensive and quite
inclusive, bare information or data has been explicitly excluded from
copyright protection under the idea/expression dichotomy, codified at
§ 102(b) of the Copyright Act: "In no case does copyright protection for
an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process,
system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery ...."3 7
Second, information on its own typically fails to qualify for
protection under the originality doctrine, which states only original
works of authorship are eligible for protection, where originality is
found in a work that is independently created by its author and
demonstrates a minimal level of creativity. 38
The threshold of
originality is quite low. Courts have largely defined the requirement in
the negative, describing what will not suffice to obtain protection, but
facts and data generally have been found deficient. 39
33
34

See Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 427.
17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 106 (2006). Copyright protection is available for a wide range of
expressive creations, including literary works, musical works, dramatic works, choreographic
works, graphic or sculptural works, motion pictures and other audiovisual works, sound
recordings, and architectural works. See§§ 102(a), 106.
35 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006).
36 See Hughes, supra note 12, at 162 (noting that databases were perceived to have at least
some protection in copyright prior to 1991, although the amount of coverage was ambiguous and
varied by jurisdiction).
37 17 u.s.c. § 102(b) (2006).
38 See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 358 (1991) (noting that
"[f]acts are never original"); see also id. at 347 ("[F]acts do not owe their origin to an act of
authorship. The distinction is one between creation and discovery: The first person to find and
report a particular fact has not created the fact; he or she has merely discovered its existence.").
39 David E. Shipley, Thin But Not Anorexic: Copyright Protection for Compilations and
Other Fact Works, 15 J. lNTELL. PROP. L. 91, 93 (2007). At least one commentator has argued
that not all facts are created equal and that "created facts" may be sufficiently original to satisfY
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Third, information products are often considered "compilations"40
and are likely to fail the special originality requirement associated with
that type of work. Although the compilation may include preexisting
materials or data, the originality requirement is met only when the
selection, coordination, or arrangement of the information meets the
threshold of originality. 41 Even if a particular information product
meets this requirement, the protection is quite weak; for compilations of
existing works, the underlying data "may be freely copied because
copyright protects only the elements that owe their origin to the
compiler-the selection, coordination, and arrangement of facts." 42
Further, computer-implemented databases often lack any sort of
"arrangement" that the originality requirement seeks, because
technology has made this arrangement irrelevant. 43
Both the idea/expression dichotomy and the originality
requirement (generally and with respect to compilations) serve to
facilitate a balance between encouraging creativity on one hand, and
permitting access to information and ideas on the other. 44 To reach this
sense of balance, copyright law even grants partial property rights,
extending protection to the "form in which an author has chosen to cast
her thoughts or concepts and not to the thoughts or concepts
themselves," 45 thereby leaving the information free from protection.
The idea/expression dichotomy also ensures that copyright, generally, is
completely consistent with the First Amendment's requirement that
information be generally free.46
A primary difficulty in applying the doctrines of idea/expression
and originality, however, comes in determining how to categorize
information products. Which portion of a work is unprotectable idea
and which portion is protectable expression? What portion of a
compilation represents originality of selection, coordination, or

the originality requirement. See Justin Hughes, Created Facts and the Flawed Ontology of
Copyright Law, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 43, 59 (2007).
40 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) ("A 'compilation' is a work formed by the collection and
assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a
way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship.").
41 See id.
42 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 359.
43 See Jane C. Ginsburg, No "Sweat"? Copyright and Other Protection of Works of
Information After Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 338, 345 (1992). Computer
technology and the ability to store and retrieve seemingly infinite amounts of data have also
skewed the "selection" requirement.
44 See BOYLE, supra note I, at 56-57.
45 See Zimmerman, supra note 8, at 666.
46 See id. at 669 ("Efforts to control the use of information or ideas by others will generally
be doomed from the outset if the claim is classified as an attempt to interfere with freedom of
speech. If, however, a claimant can march the same basic dispute onto the field and successfully
raise the standard of property rights, her likelihood of success will improve markedly.").
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arrangement? 47 For works other than information products, the line
between idea and expression is often easier to draw, either because the
nature of the work makes it simple to demarcate, such as a household
ornament, or because we have clear rules as to how to distinguish, as in
the case of a fiction novel. 48 Information products, however, typically
reside at some point at or near the division between idea and expression,
or may even encompass both in a non-severable fashion. 4 9
While copyright law may have initially, albeit superficially,
seemed hospitable to protecting information products, courts have
squarely addressed both the idea/expression dichotomy and the
originality requirement for the two primary types of information
products-databases and software-and have concluded that any
protection under copyright is quite limited. The originality requirement
as applied to compilations, such as databases, is set forth in the Supreme
Court's Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service Co. 5° opinion; the
dividing line between idea and expression in software works is explored
by the Second Circuit in Computer Associates International v. Altai,
Inc. 51 Because of the impact these cases have had on the potential
protection available for information products, they will be discussed
briefly below.
In the Feist case, the Supreme Court clarified the level of
originality required for a database to receive protection under copyright
law. The databases at issue in Feist were published telephone
directories. Rural had a monopoly franchise to provide telephone
service to a number of communities and, pursuant to state law, was
required to update and publish annually a standard white pages listing of
its customers. 52 Feist wished to publish area-wide telephone books,
some portions overlapping with areas serviced by RuraJ.5 3 When Rural
refused to license its listings, Feist simply took the necessary portions of
the directories and incorporated them into its area directories. In a
copyright infringement suit brought by Rural, both the district court and
the Tenth Circuit found Rural's directories were protected by copyright
law and held Feist liable for infringement.54
Feist appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari to
resolve a circuit split about the viability of the sweat-of-the-brow
doctrine-that is, whether copyright protection could be granted for
industrious collection or whether protection was reserved for works of
47 See id. at 668-69.
48 See Dreyfuss, supra note 2, at 903.
49 See id. at 904.
50 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
51 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
52 Feist, 499 U.S. at 342.

53 !d. at 342-43.
54

!d. at 344.
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creative expression only. 55 Based on its analysis of the history of the
Copyright Act, the Court concluded that Congress, in the 1976
Copyright Act, specifically overruled the sweat-of-the-brow doctrine by
requiring originality for the protection of compilations. 56 On the facts
of Feist, the Court determined Rural's directory was not protected under
copyright because the selection of listings was obvious and the
arrangement was "not only unoriginal, [but] practically inevitable" and
"devoid of even the slightest trace of creativity." 57
From the Feist case, the following analysis constrains the extent of
copyright protection available for databases: 1) facts are not
independently eligible for copyright; 2) that facts are compiled by
industrious collection or sweat of the brow does not alter the noncopyrightable nature of the facts; and 3) collections of facts (and
databases generally) become eligible for copyright protection only
through a showing of creativity in the unique or original selection,
coordination, or arrangement of the facts. 5 8 Court opinions subsequent
to Feist demonstrate that this burden of originality often keeps factual
compilations from copyright protection. 59 Various, seemingly useful,
databases, such as specialized yellow pages, catalog numbers for parts,
data about collectibles or car values, and classifications and taxonomies,
have all been denied protection. 60 To avoid falling outside the scope of
copyright protection, database owners have sought to qualify for
copyright protection by injecting arbitrary creativity into the selection
and arrangement of facts in their databases. 61 Unfortunately, in doing
so, the database creator is often decreasing the product's utility, which
derives value from having a comprehensive (albeit obvious) selection of
facts provided in an easy to use (but unoriginal) arrangement. 62 Thus,
for many databases, an important category of information products,
copyright protection is simply not available.
The scope of protection for computer programs has similarly
provided the courts with the opportunity to clarify the application of the
idea/expression dichotomy. Much software appears to encompass
expressive features (for example, in the visual portions or graphical user
!d. at 345-46.
!d. at 354-56; see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defming a compilation as "a work formed
by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated,
or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of
authorship" (emphasis added)).
57 Feist, 499 U.S. at 362-63.
58 !d. at 358.
59 See Shipley, supra note 39, at 99.
60 See id. at 99-130.
61 See James Gibson, Re-ReifYing Data, 80NOTRE DAME L. REv. 163, 181 (2004).
62 See Shipley, supra note 39, at 130 ("[A] comprehensive compilation that includes all the
facts, data, or information from a defined class will rarely exhibit sufficient creativity in
selection.").
55

56
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interfaces) 63 as well as idea or functional features (for example, the
working algorithms that drive the program's behavior). Underlying
both of these outwardly visible features is the code itself, the computer
language that instantiates both the expressive and functional aspects that
are apparent to a user of the program. Computer code itself has been
found to include both idea and expression components as welJ.6 4 Thus,
the answer to the question of whether software is a copyrightable
expression or a non-copyrightable (and potentially patentable)65
functional idea is that it is both. 66 It is determining the placement of this
line between functional ideas and creative expression that creates
difficulty in obtaining copyright protection for software, as explained in
the Altai case.
In the Altai case, the Second Circuit attempted to solve this
difficulty and determine what portion of software is covered by
copyright protection; the result of this attempt is the widely adopted, yet
The
difficult to apply, "abstraction-filtration-comparison" test. 67
dispute between Computer Associates and Altai arose because both
companies had offered software that organized and efficiently scheduled
a set of tasks for a computer. 68 The Computer Associates program was
adapted to run on multiple IBM operating systems, while Altai's
program ran on only one operating system. 69 Computer Associate's
program was more successful; Altai's customers were predictably
displeased. 70 In an attempt to compete, Altai hired a former employee
of Computer Associates, who proceeded to copy a significant portion of
Computer Associate's adapter code and incorporate it into Altai's
scheduling program.7 1 Computer Associates filed suit against Altai,
claiming both misappropriation of trade secrets and copyright
infringement of the adapter computer code. 72
Both the district court and the Second Circuit struggled to apply
traditional copyright law to computer programs. The district court
recognized computer software has two aspects-a static structure,
63 Courts have, however, denied copyright protection for some user interfaces of software,
reasoning that the interface functions as a method for operating a computer program. See, e.g.,
Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 816 (1st Cir. 1995).
64 See Pamela Samuelson, et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer
Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2308, 2310 ( 1994).
65 Patent protection for the functional aspects of software, however, is in a state of flux and
coverage is uncertain. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
66 See Michael J. Madison, Law as Design: Objects, Concepts, and Digital Things, 56 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 381, 414 (2005).
67 See, e.g., Lateef Mtima, So Dark the CON(TU) of Man: The Quest for a Software
Derivative Work Right in Section 117, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 23, 95 n.226 (2007).
68 Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d at 698-99 (2d Cir. 1992).
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Jd. at 700.
72 Jd.
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which is the text of the code and the arrangement of the instructions,
and a dynamic structure, which is the way the program runs and reacts
to user inputs. 73 Because the court determined that the dynamic
component is simply a process or idea and thus cannot be protected by
copyright law, the court analyzed only the static, source code, portion of
the software at issue, and found no infringement. 74 On appeal, the
Second Circuit did not limit its review to only the static portion of the
software, but held instead that some non-literal structures of computer
programs may be protected by copyright to prevent the clever infringer
from merely rewriting the code to avoid liability; 75 the difficulty is in
deciding which elements are eligible for protection, leading the court to
develop the abstraction-filtration-comparison test. In applying the test,
a court is to first "dissect the allegedly copied program's structure and
isolate each level of abstraction contained within it." 76 Next, the court
determines whether the inclusion of each level of abstraction "was
'idea' or dictated by considerations of efficiency, so as to be necessarily
incidental to that idea; required by factors external to the program itself;
or taken from the public domain." 77 The components required by idea
or efficiency are not eligible for copyright protection; the remaining,
expressive portions are protectable and, at the last step of the Altai test,
are compared with the corresponding portion of the allegedly infringing
product to determine infringement. 78
The first step, isolating levels of abstraction, represented an
important acknowledgement that software exists on many levels and
that the idea/expression dichotomy may be relevant at each of these
levels.79 However, the second step of filtering out idea and expression
at each level is much more difficult to apply and has been quite
controversial. 80 In any case, it is clear that copyright protection does not
extend to many of the more important, functional aspects of computer
programs. Thus, as with databases, the more useful portions or
embodiments of software lie beyond the protection of copyright law.
Even if an information product, such as a database or software
program, were found to meet both the requirements of originality and
73 Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544, 559-60 (E.D.N.Y. 1991)
[hereinafter Altai 1].
74 /d. at 560.
75 Altai, 982 F.2d at 706.
76 !d. at 707.
77 !d.
78 !d. at 710.
79 See, e.g., Andrew G. Isztwan, Computer Associates International v. Altai, Inc.: Protecting
the Strncture of Computer Software in the Second Circuit, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 423, 448-49
(1993).
80 See, e.g., Margaret Chon, Postmodern "Progress": Reconsidering the Copyright and
Patent Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 97, 112 (1993); Mark D. Perdue & Robert A. Felsman, Recent
Developments in Copyright Law, 4 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 459, 469 (1996).
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expressiveness discussed above, there is a third doctrine in copyright
law-fair use-that could easily decimate any protection obtained. Fair
use is a defense to copyright infringement that essentially allows, in
certain circumstances, unauthorized use by someone other than the
copyright owner.8 1 Although it began as a judicially created doctrine,
fair use has been codified and applies to all copyrighted works.8 2 The
fair use analysis is based on four non-determinative factors: 1) the
purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 2) the
nature of the copyrighted work; 3) the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 4) the
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.83 The second factor, the nature of the work, nearly
always weighs against the creators of databases and computer programs
because these works already reside at the margin of copyright coverage
due to their information content. 84
Because of this particular
applicability to databases and software, fair use likely eviscerates any
protection that might otherwise be available.

II.

WHY ALTERNATIVE LEGAL AND NON-LEGAL MECHANISMS
WORK

Do NOT

In the absence of traditional intellectual property protection under
either patent law or copyright law, creators of information products
have sought various alternative legal and non-legal mechanisms to
provide some manner of exclusivity in which to reap a benefit from
their development investments. Legal theories advanced include quasiintellectual property doctrines, such as liability under trade secret and
misappropriation, as well as non-intellectual property claims in contract
and trespass, among others. Non-legal options have included using
technological or operational mechanisms that provide some measure of
exclusivity, or at least some sort of artificial lead-time, to the creator of
81 See Robert C. Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protection of
Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 516,524 (1981) (defining fair use as a "privilege
in others than the owner of a copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner
without his consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the owner by the copyright."
(citation omitted)).
82 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006); Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (D. Mass. 1841).
83 See 17 U.S.C. § 107; see also Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
560-69 (1985) (explaining the fair use factors).
84 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 563 (explaining that information products are favored as
subjects of the fair use defense and that the importance of disseminating factual works to the
public also weighs in favor of fair use). It should be noted, however, that the second factor has
little significant effect on the fair use inquiry. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S.
Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549,586 (2008).
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the information product. As appealing as these options may seem, they
each have one or more significant flaws-most yield incomplete
coverage, some are unlikely to withstand judicial scrutiny, some are
difficult to apply on a large scale, and all fail to provide the oversight
and safety valves that are essential in traditional intellectual property
regimes. As a result, resort to these mechanisms leads to both
overprotection and under-protection of information products.
A.

Trade Secret Protection

Trade secret protection IS often considered an auxiliary to the
traditional intellectual property regimes and so would seem to be a
natural next choice for an information product's creator seeking to
protect his investment. Trade secret protection, a state law mechanism,
generally covers valuable or commercial information to the extent that
information is kept secret. 85 However, many information products
derive some or all of their value from the fact that the information can
be used publicly, and thus these works are not eligible for trade secret
protection.86 Also, because trade secret protection arises from state law,
there may be variations from state to state that make enforcement more
costly or difficult.8 7 Finally, as a matter of policy, trade secret law is
typically disfavored because it actually inhibits, rather than promotes,
the flow of information via the disclosure or dissemination encouraged
by the traditional intellectual property regimes. 88 As such, even if trade
secret coverage is available for information products and the differences
in the laws across the various states are insignificant, trade secret
85 See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001-02 (1984) (defining a trade
secret as "information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to
obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it ... the extent of the property
right therein is defined by the extent to which the owner of the secret protects his interest from
disclosure to others" (citation omitted)); Constance E. Bagley & Gavin Clarkson, Adverse
Possession for Intellectual Property: Adapting an Ancient Concept to Resolve Conflicts Between
Antitrust and Intellectual Property Laws in the Information Age, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 327,332
(2003). Know-how protection, a contractual agreement to share information, is similar in that it
too relies on the secrecy value of the information and is governed by state law. See, e.g., J.H.
Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
2432, 2438-39 (1994).
86 An alternative way to look at this is that trade secret protection is available if the creator of
the information product forgoes the value corresponding to the public use of the information and
keeps the work secret instead. This is analogous to the database creator devaluing his information
product by being less than exhaustive in his content or less than logical in his arrangement. See
supra note 61 and accompanying text.
87 Many states (specifically, 42 states and the District of Columbia by 1999) however, have
based their trade secret laws around the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, so the variations may be
insignificant. See Bagley & Clarkson, supra note 85, at 332.
88 See, e.g., Chris J. Katopis, Patients v. Patents?: Policy Implications of Recent Patent
Legislation, 71 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 329,377 (1997).

2009] INFORMATION MAY WANT TO BE FREE . . .

2115

protection is inappropriate because it lacks the safety valve of
disclosure.
B.

Misappropriation

The misappropriation doctrine, which prohibits the unauthorized
taking of another's works, has also been used as a mechanism for
protecting products where other intellectual property regimes do not
seem to apply,8 9 as is the case with many information products. It was
in precisely this circumstance that the Supreme Court gave life to the
doctrine in International News Service v. The Associated Press case.9°
International News Service (INS) obtained over wire service many news
stories that had been gathered and prepared by the Associated Press
(AP). 91 Before AP could publish the stories itself, INS published the
same stories in its own publications.n The news stories prepared by AP
were not eligible for copyright protection because the works failed to
meet the originality and expression requirements. 93 Further, the news
stories were not subject to trade secret protection because the stories had
not been kept secret. 94 Yet, the Court upheld an injunction against INS,
prohibiting it from using AP's news bulletins in this way.9 5 The Court
based the liability of INS on misappropriation. 96 This expanded liability
for misappropriation, however, was limited to "hot news" and may have
signaled the Court's discomfort with the resuJt.9 7 More recent cases
applying the misappropriation doctrine have reinforced and heightened
the "hot news" limitation.98 Although the "hot news" requirement
serves as a safety valve to limit the scope of misappropriation coverage,
it also limits the ability of the doctrine to provide adequate protection
for the majority of information products, which often include
information beyond merely "hot news."

89 See Charles Brill, Legal Protection of Collections of Facts, 1998 COMP. L. REV. & TECH. J.
I, 20 (1998).
90 284 U.S. 215 (1918).
91 !d. at 231.
92 !d.
93 In particular, the Court would not credit AP with ownership of the news simply because
AP happened to report it, nor could AP claim copyright infringement because INS was not simply
taking AP's expression, but rather using the unprotectable facts. !d. at 234-37.
94 !d. at 235.
95 !d. at 245-46.
96 !d.
97 See Zimmerman, supra note 8, at 721.
98 See, e.g., Nat' I Basketball Ass'n. v. Motorola Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (1997)(applying an INS v.
AP analysis and requiring a quite narrow "hot news" component to avoid preemption by
copyright laws).
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Contract

Because traditional intellectual property regimes, as well as
schemes like trade secret and misappropriation that have developed at
the margins of intellectual property, fail to provide sufficient protection
for information products, creators of these works often tum to other
legal means, like contract, to limit the use (or misuse) of the products.
Databases and software in particular have often found protection via
contract and have been subject to both negotiated and shrink-wrap
licenses. 99 Where a negotiated contract involves the usual agreement
between the two participating parties, shrinkwrap licenses typically go
into force when the customer opens the packaging that encloses the
product, even though the customer may not actually get to review the
terms of the license until after it has already been entered and the
customer certainly did not take part in negotiating the terms.Ioo
Although the validity of shrinkwrap licenses has been questioned, they
have uniformly been found valid and enforceable. 101
One well-known case where a shrinkwrap license was held valid
and enforceable against a user of an information product is the ProCD
v. Zeidenberg case. 102 In ProCD, the information product was a single
electronic database consisting of the combination of digitized phone
books from across the United States. 103 This type of database, because
of its lack of originality in selection or arrangement, was not eligible for
copyright protection after Feist; ProCD, the database creator, instead
used contracts to license use of the product and to limit the use of the
data included in the database by specifically prohibiting the reposting of
the contents of the database on the Intemet. 104 In determining whether
Zeidenberg had breached the contract, the district court held that the
shrinkwrap license was preempted by the Copyright Act and not
enforceable. 105 ProCD appealed this issue to the Seventh Circuit, which
held that enforcement of shrinkwrap licenses where the contract terms
are not contrary to regular contract rules does not run afoul of the
Copyright Act, is not preempted, and can be a valid mechanism for
protecting information products.I06
99 See Brill, supra note 89, at 24.
See Jacqueline D. Lipton, IP's Problem Child: Shifting the Paradigms for Software
Protection, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 205, 221 n.96 (2006). See generally Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual
Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239 (1995).
101 See Lemley, supra note 100, at 221 n.96.

100

102
103

86 F.3d 1447 (7thCir. 1996).
at 1449.
104
at 1450.
105 at 1453.
106 at 1454-55.

!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
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Contract law certainly provides an appealing alternative to
traditional intellectual property protection. Like intellectual property
regimes, contracts carry the force of law. Businesses are comfortable
and familiar with contracts, probably even more so than intellectual
property. Further, after ProCD, contracts can be written to restrict
virtually any legal behavior. And above all, shrinkwrap licenses, which
are common in the information product industry, permit a one-sided
determination by the creator of what types of access and use are
permissible.
Despite this allure, however, there are disadvantages to using
contract law to protect information products. The first disadvantage is
that effective use of contract law may be difficult in practice for a
number of reasons. While contractual protection may be useful for
information products used by a small number of consumers, it may
become unwieldy to actually police and enforce as the number of users
grows. 107 Also, because of the easily transferable nature of information
products, the enforceability of the contractual provisions may be
compromised because contract terms can only be enforced against
parties in privity; once the information product is released to a nonassociated third party, there is no recourse against that third party who
was not privy to the contract. 108 Further, because contract law is a state
law creation, it is not uniform domestically, and contracts are difficult,
if not impossible, to enforce globally. 109 The second disadvantage is
that contract law provides little or no oversight or safety valves and thus
allows protection of information beyond the scope that may be deemed
acceptable by the public. Because of the importance of freely flowing
information, a protection scheme such as contract that permits the
creator great latitude in keeping information from being used is not an
acceptable protection scheme.

D.

Trespass to Chattels

Although trade secret, misappropriation, and contract law have
been the primary non-intellectual property legal sources used to protect
information products, some courts have taken far more creative
approaches to craft what they consider a fair resolution in cases of
misappropriation of information products. One such approach is

See Brill, supra note 89, at 25.
See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1454 ("Contracts ... generally affect only their parties."); Brill,
supra note 89, at 25; Sharon K. Sandeen, A Contract by Any Other Name Is Still a Contract:
Examining the Effectiveness of Trade Secret Clauses to Protect Databases, 45 IDEA 119, 147
(2005).
109 See Bitton, supra note 9, at 160.
107
108
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trespass to chattels, notably applied in the eBay v. Bidder's Edge
case. 11 0
Generally speaking, this tort involves the unauthorized
interference with or use of another's personal property that results in
damage. 111 The eBay court stretched this doctrine to apply to a situation
where a "web crawler" program was systematically obtaining auction
information from websites. 112 Although the unauthorized interference
or use was clear, the requisite damage was not; rather, the court based
its reasoning on the potential damage that would (or could) result after
the computer system crashed under the aggregate effects of many of
these web crawler programs. 113 Despite the novelty and creativity of the
application of this doctrine, there are significant limitations to its
widespread use. First, the doctrine provides incomplete coverage
because it is of little use to creators of information products that do not
reside on servers (such as printed or CD-ROM databases or software
distributed on disk media) because there can be no damage, even
considering the low threshold level of "potential crashing" that the eBay
court found. The coverage is also incomplete because the tort will only
apply to infringing activities that may, in the aggregate, cause server or
network damage. 114 While web crawling may be resource consuming
and present a chance of crashing a server in the presence of multiple
intrusions, a simple single copy may not have that potential for causing
damage, even if the information product resides on a server. Second,
this claim has been tested in very few circumstances; it may be unlikely
to withstand judicial scrutiny were it to be used more frequently.
Finally, even though the trespass to chattels claim is unlikely to create a
viable level of protection for most information products, it is disfavored
because it too lacks any sort of oversight or safety valve: essentially, if
there is damage to the creator based on access to the information
product, liability may be found, but there is no effort to protect and
facilitate the use of information generally.
E.

Other Legal Protection

In certain limited circumstances, other legal theories may provide

110 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000); see also Margaret Jane Radin, Incomplete
Commodification in a Computerized World, in THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION 3
(Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil Weinstock Netanel, eds. 2002).
Ill See Thrifty- Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 4 73 (Cal. App. 1996); Bitton, supra
note 9, at 166.
112 eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2dat 1069-70.
113 /d. at 1069-72.
114 See Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 306-07 (Cal. 2003) (finding no trespass to chattels
where there was no physical harm to the computer system); see also Radin, supra note II 0, at
403-05; Bitton, supra note 9, at 167.
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potential protection for information products. For example, criminal
law may be used to protect many features of electronic databases and
software, based on computer crime and anti-hacking statutes. 115 Privacy
and confidentiality laws may provide a level of protection for databases
that contain certain types of personal data. 116 However, these theories
are available only in specialized circumstances and do not provide
broad or certain coverage. Further, none of these theories have the
built-in safety valves or oversight necessary for appropriate coverage of
information products.

F.

Partial Legal Coverage

Although legal protection, either via intellectual property regimes
or otherwise, is generally incomplete in its coverage of information
products, it can potentially be used to provide at least partial coverage
or coverage of certain aspects of the work, especially where these
aspects are added with the purpose of deterring copying and enhancing
legal protection. One good example of this is a legal database, such as
those maintained by LEXIS and Westlaw. 117 The underlying data in
these databases, namely the opinions of courts, are not protected by
copyright; however, the database provider adds copyrightable elements,
in the form of case summaries and head notes, as well as proprietary
searching means and graphical interfaces. 118 These elements can be,
and are, protected then by copyright law. Further, LEXIS and Westlaw
also limit access through contract and licensing provisions. Using
multiple methods of coverage in conjunction may provide the creator of
an information product with a more adequate level of protection for his
work; however, the combination of protection schemes also makes it
difficult to access and legally copy that data that is within the public
domain and should be free for use. Therefore, the wider scope of
protection actually ends up creating a greater inhibition to the free flow
of information, and this method is not favorable.

115 See Jane C. Ginsburg, A Marriage of Convenience? A Comment on the Protection of
Databases, 82 CHL-KENT L. REV. 1171, 1172-73 (2007) (noting that the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (2006), which prohibits unauthorized, damaging access to
computers for the purpose of obtaining information, may be useful against competitors who
"copy frequently updated information from a 'dynamic' database"); Bitton, supra note 9, at 148.
116 See Bitton, supra note 9, at 149.
117 See id. at 136. The LexisNexis database is available at http://www.lexis.com, while the
Westlaw database is available at http://www.westlaw.com.
118 See Bitton, supra note 9, at 136.
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Non-Legal Mechanisms

Despite the wide variety of legal means that have been applied to
protect information products, the extent of coverage available for these
works and the ease of obtaining that coverage remains quite uncertain,
both for practical and doctrinal reasons. Thus, creators of information
products have also explored non-legal mechanisms, such as
technological measures and creative business plans, to obtain the
artificial lead-time or measure of exclusivity required to protect some of
their investment in the creation of these works.
1.

Technological Mechanisms

The most common non-legal mechanism for protecting information
products is the use of technological safeguards to prevent against
unauthorized access, uses and appropriation of these products. 11 9
Digital rights management (DRM) tools may be used, for example, to
limit who may access the work, the duration for which access is
allowed, and the ability to reproduce or retransmit the work. 120 Anticircumvention laws, which prohibit the disabling or hacking of DRM
tools, provide a layer of legal protection on top of the technological
layer. 121 For example, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)
makes illegal the circumvention of DRM tools that control access to a
work if done with the intent to violate any rights under copyright law. 122
Beyond DRM technology, the way some information products are
naturally configured provides additional options for technological
safeguards. For example, many database management systems are set
up so that access to the entirety (or even a substantial portion) of the
contained database is difficult, if not impossible. 123
While not perfect, DRM technology and limited access rights have
been used with some success to protect investments in information
products. The most significant disadvantage with DRM technology
(and taking advantage of the natural configurations of these products) is
that it can be, and often is, used to limit access to information content
that should not be so limited and thus inhibit information flow. 124 The
119 See Peter K. Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-anticircumvention, 84 DENY. U. L. REV. 13,
14 (2006).
120 See Dan L. Burk, DNA Rules: Legal and Conceptual Implications of Biological "LockOut" Systems, 92 CAL. L. REv. 1553, 1563 (2004).
121 See Yu, supra note 119, at 32.
122 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006).
123 See Bitton, supra note 9, at 142.
124 See Dan L. Burk & Tarleton Gillespie, Autonomy and Morality in DRM and Anti-
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creator can use these means to include and obtain protection over more
content than he might be able to get under a legal scheme. For example,
the creator might use DRM to prohibit any copying of a computer disk
containing an information product, even though a purchaser of a
computer disk is typically permitted to make a back up copy for
personal use. While this may encourage the creators of these works by
providing enhanced protection, this method is not favorable because the
over-inclusion of content being protected will likely inhibit, not
facilitate, information flow, especially in the absence of associated
oversight and safety valves.
2.

Business Schemes

One of the main justifications for providing a protection scheme
for information products is to give the creator of the work an artificial
lead-time to receive some level of compensation for his efforts. As
discussed above, this is particularly critical for information products, as
the cost of development is front-end loaded and the end-product is
easily duplicable and transferable.
While legal schemes and
technological measures provide an artificial lead-time in order for the
creator to recoup his investment, business schemes have been used to
give the creator a different sort of advantage over his competitors and a
means to obtain compensation for the development costs associated
with the information product. Although it is often necessary to use one
of these other means in conjunction with the business scheme, the
below-described options may decrease the amount of artificial lead-time
or exclusivity that a creator needs to reap the desired reward. Two of
these potential business schemes are the provision of complementary
services or bundling of products and differentiated market pricing.
The provision of auxiliary services or bundling of related products
is particularly useful in the information products industry. Although the
information product itself may be unprotectable, the creator uses the
additional service or product to distinguish himself and develop a
consumer base that gives him the market advantage necessary to recoup
the resources invested in creating the information product. In contrast, a
party that merely appropriates (or misappropriates) the developed
information product will likely be uninterested in or incapable of
providing this panel of complementary goods and services, and thus will
be less attractive to consumers. 125 There are a number of successful
examples of this business model, particularly in the open source
Circumvention Law, 4 TRIPLE C 239, 244 (2006), available at http://triplec.uti.at/files/
tripleC4(2)/Burk-Gillespie.pdf.
125 See Bitton, supra note 9, at 127.
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software industry. 126 One such company is Red Hat, 127 which has been
built around the model of providing services to accompany Linux, 128 an
open source software product that specifically cannot be protected by
typical protection schemes. 12 9 In the absence of being able to protect
the software product, Red Hat has developed value and a consumer
following for its particular accompanying services, which gives it an
advantage over other companies that can also distribute Linux products.
Database providers may provide similar valuable services such as
possession of the infrastructure for service, ongoing enhancement, and
maintenance. 130
Database providers may also bundle the actual
database with powerful proprietary search engines or management
systems. 131 These complementary products and services are not likely
to be available from a party who merely appropriates the database, and
such add-ons give the creator of the information product an advantage,
in the absence of exclusivity, to allow him to benefit over other
providers.
Another business scheme that allows an information product
creator to recoup the resources he invested into the development of the
work is differentiated pricing, although this system often does require at
least some level of exclusivity to be successful. 132 However, if
differentiated pricing can be used, the period of exclusivity required to
reap an adequate return may be decreased. Differentiated pricing
involves charging different segments of the consumer market different
prices, based on each segment's need and ability to pay.m For
example, if the information product creator:
is able to segment the market into commercial and academic sectors
successfully, and if the demand in the academic sector is more pricesensitive than in the commercial sector, we will obtain the outcome
which prevails in several disciplines: provision of the good at two
126 In the open source software industry, participants specifically eschew intellectual property
protection for their products. Instead, the open source movement is based on a protocol of
openness and sharing. Yet, even with their works being unprotected, some companies have
created businesses around these products. See ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND THE
BAZAAR (200 I). Although open source creators opt for a lack of protection, the business models
that have been used in this industry are applicable to the information product arena as well.
127
See Red Hat, http://www.redhat.com.
128
See Linux Online, http://www.linux.org.
129 See RAYMOND, supra note 126, at 137.
130 See Bitton, supra note 9, at 127.
131 See Dov S. Greenbaum, The Database Debate: In Support of an Inequitable Solution, 13
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 431, 483-84 (2003).
132 See Bitton, supra note 9, at 136.
133 See Bronwyn H. Hall, On Copyright and Patent Protection for Software and Databases: A
Tale of Two Worlds, in ECONOMICS, LAW & INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: SEEKING STRATEGIES
FOR RESEARCH AND TEACHING IN A DEVELOPING FIELD 259, 270 (Ove Granstrand, ed. 2003).
Although Hall is focused on software and databases, there is no reason that the reasoning would
not apply to information products generally, as these works are defined by the characteristic of
high fixed development costs and low duplication and transfer costs.
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widely differing prices, often differentiated in a variety of ways to
ensure that the markets remain segmented."134

Bronwyn Hall explains this is a matter of simple economic theory:
[I]f society benefits from researchers having access to some forms of
information at low cost, and there exists private sector willingness to
pay for that information, then subsidies to researchers so that they
can acquire the information would be socially beneficial, and at the
same time, would leave the incentives to produce the information
intact." 135

In the absence of protection, however, price differentiation is not likely
to succeed; this tool works best in conjunction with one of the other
legal or technical mechanisms discussed above.
Neither of these business schemes-provision of accompanying
goods or services nor price differentiation-solves the problem of
giving the creators of information products the protection desired while
still facilitating and encouraging the flow of information. For this
reason, these means of providing an information product creator with a
market advantage using business means are not favorable.
H.

International and Proposed Schemes

The lack of protection for information products is not new, nor is it
unique to the United States. In the international arena, improved
protection systems for information products have been implemented,
although it is unclear whether the schemes have been successful. In this
country, legislators and academic commentators have offered numerous
proposals over the years aimed at providing improved protection for
information products in this country, but none have been implemented.
In any case, both the international schemes and the proposed systems
are fairly similar to the legal and alternative means described above, and
thus suffer from the same shortcomings.
1.

International Protection

The most visible international protection for any form of
information product is found in the European Union (EU) Directive on
the protection of databases (Database Directive). 13 6 The Database
134 !d.
135 See id. at 273.
136 Council Directive 96/9 1996 O.J. (L077) 20 (EC).

Other countries have examined
protection for databases as well; these analyses often tum on a review of "originality," like the
Feist decision in the United States, and so will not be independently reviewed in this paper. For a
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Directive was developed in "response to perceived needs to harmonize
protection for databases within the EU and to provide greater protection
for the investment in the creation and maintenance of databases." 13 7
The Database Directive sought to achieve this greater protection in two
ways: harmonizing the standard for granting copyright protection in
databases and implementing a sui generis protection scheme for
databases that failed to qualify for copyright protection.
First, the Database Directive harmonizes copyright protection for
databases in member countries, basing protection on the original
selection or arrangement of the data. 13 8 This provision, requiring
members to grant copyright protection in databases that, "by reason of
their selection or arrangement of their contents, constitute the author's
own intellectual creation," 139 is not unlike the Feist standard in the
United States. As discussed above with respect to protection for
information products under copyright law, this provision of the
Directive fails to adequately protect most useful databases. 140
Second, the Database Directive creates a sui generis right for the
protection of databases that do not qualify under the originality
requirement for copyright protection, so long as a substantial
investment, either qualitative or quantitative, has been made in
obtaining, verifying, or presenting the contents of a database. 141 The sui
generis right lasts for fifteen years, but can be extended (theoretically,
into perpetuity) if the database is updated and maintained. This right is
infringed where a qualitatively or quantitatively substantial portion of
the database is taken, either via extraction or reutilization, without
authorization. 142 Although the sui generis right facially appears to grant

detailed treatment of protection available for databases in countries such as Australia, Canada,
China, and Russia, see Daniel J. Gervais, The Protection of Databases, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REv.
1109, 1148-57 (2007).
137 See Mark Davison, Database Protection: The Commodification of Information, in THE
FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN INFORMATION LAW 167, 168
(Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt Hugenholz eds., 2006).
138 See Council Directive, supra note 136, art. 3(1).
139 !d.
140 See supra Part LB.
141 See Council Directive, supra note 136, art. 7(1).
142 Extraction refers to the transfer of the contents of a database to another medium by any
means. See Council Directive, supra note 136, art. 7(2)(a). Reutilization refers to making
available to the public the contents of a database by distribution, renting, or putting online. See
Council Directive, supra note 136, art. 7(2)(b).
The sui generis right also permits member states to allow an exception to infringement by
unauthorized taking of portions of the database in three circumstances: I) where the reproduction
of a non-electronic database is for private purposes; 2) where the sole purpose is illustration for
teaching and scientific research, as long as the source is indicated, and only to the extent justified;
and 3) where the use is for purposes of public security or for administrative or judicial
procedures. See Council Directive, supra note 136, art. 9; Lipton, supra note II, at 154-56.
Although the fair use exception in the United States weighs heavily against creators of
information products, the exception provided by the Directive is more fairly applicable and does
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sufficient, but not overreaching, rights to creators of information
products, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has substantially limited
the right in practice. In British Horseracing Board v. William Hill
Organization, the ECJ held that "created" data was not protectable by
the sui generis right. 143 In the William Hill case, the data in question
was horse racing information, such as race times and locations,
maintained in a database by the British Horseracing Board. Although
Britain's High Court of Justice had determined that the database was
protected by the sui generis right, based on the resources expended in
keeping it current, and that William Hill had infringed the right by
systematically extracting information from the database for profit, the
ECJ overturned the decision, reasoning that since the British
Horseracing Board had created the factual data content of the database
(rather than obtained the data), it was not the type of investment
required to be eligible for the sui generis right. 144 Because many useful
information products include both "obtained" data and "created" data,
the sui generis right does not provide sufficient protection for these
works.
Finally, the impact of the Database Directive on the information
product industry and the future of the Database Directive are unclear.
In December 2005, a working paper evaluating the Database Directive
was released, concluding that "[t]he economic impact of the 'sui
generis' right on database protection is unproven. Introduced to
stimulate the production of databases in Europe, the new instrument has
had no proven impact on the production of database." 145 However, the
database industries were also surveyed for the report; these business
concerns indicated their belief that the sui generis protection was critical
for their continued success. 146 Although the effect, if any, is unclear
and there are critics calling for repeal of or at least change to the sui
generis protection scheme, the EU has not yet changed course and,
given the perception of the database industry, may never.

not eviscerate the protection granted as extensively as the fair use provision in the United States.
143 Case C-203/02 British Horseracing Bd. Ltd. v. William Hill Org. Ltd., available at
http:/leuropa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/copyright/prot-databases/jurisprudence_en.htm.
144 See id.; see also Mark J. Davison & P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Football Fixtures, Horse Races
and Spin-offs: The ECJ Domesticates the Database Right, 27 EUR. lNTELL. PROP. REV. 113
(2005).
145 See Commission of the European Communities, DG Internal Market and Services Working
Paper: First Evaluation of Directive 96/9/EC on the legal protection of databases, at 5 (Dec. 12,
2005)
[Hereinafter,
Working
Paper],
available
at
http:/lec.europa.eulinternal_market/copyright/docs/databases/evaluation_report_en.pdf; see also
Davison, supra note 137, at 188, citing Working Paper at 1.4. Davison also offers reports on
litigation stemming from the Directive. /d.
146 See Working Paper, supra note 145; Bitton, supra note 9, at 113.
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Proposed Legislation

In this country, lawmakers have debated some form of protection
for databases for at least the last decade. 147 In the mid-1990s, the
United States submitted a database protection treaty proposal to the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WJPO) that was similar in
scope to the European Union Database Directive. 14 8 In fact, the
proposed treaty arguably provided stronger protection to database
compilers, with a renewable term of 25 years and a DRM provision that
prohibited circumvention of technology limiting access. 149 WIPO has
studied database protection, but little has been done because there is
much opposition, including from the United States.150
A bill parallel to the WIPO proposal was simultaneously
introduced in Congress, but was widely opposed and failed to move out
of the Judiciary Committee. 151 Two years later, database protection was
once again introduced in Congress, this time drawing from
misappropriation doctrine; while the initiative passed the floor of the
House twice, once on its own 152 and once as part of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, 153 it never made it to the Senate Floor. The
drama played out in the same way the very next year. 154 However, the
failure to enact these proposed bills seems to have less to do with the
substantive merits of the rights provisions and more to do with politics:
each of these proposals was met with significant and "wellorchestrated" opposition by key United States' companies, such as AOL
and AT&T, and academics. I 55
Taking a different tactic and with the aim of appeasing the
See Davison, supra note 137, at 174.
See Committee of Experts on a Possible Protocol to the Berne Convention, Proposal of the
United States of America on Sui Generis Protection of Databases, WlPO Doc. BCPICENIU2INRJCENV2 (May 1996); WIPO had also proposed an independent database treaty. See Brill,
supra note 89, at 41.
149 See Brill, supra note 89, at 36-40.
150 See, e.g., Justin Hughes, Political Economies of Harmonization: Database Protection and
Information Patents 10-51 (Cardozo Law School, Public Research Paper No. 47, July 8, 2002),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=318486.
151 See Brill, supra note 89, at 41; Database Investment and Intellectual Property Act of 1996,
H.R. 3531, 104th Congress (1996).
152 See Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, H.R. 2652, 105th Congress (1998); 144
Cong. Rec. 9,681 ( 1998).
153 See 144Cong. Rec. 18,783 (1998).
154 Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, H.R. 354, 106th Cong. (1999). This bill
reached the floor of the full House, but went no further.
155 See Justin Hughes, Of World Music and Sovereign States, Professors and the Formation of
Legal Norms, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 155, 186-87 (2003); see also, Yu, supra note I at 4-5 (noting
that the proposals failed because the biggest database producers at the time were not American
corporations and that the domestic companies were most concerned about their ability to use
others' databases if the legislation had passed).
147
148
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domestic business concerns, the 108th Congress next took up the issue
by proposing liability-type protection for databases, hoping to gamer
more enthusiastic support. 156 Unfortunately, these proposals fared much
the same as the bills that preceded them and never even reached the full
House. Very little action has been seen in this area since 2004 and there
has been no indication that protection for information products will be
taken up by Congress in the near future.
3.

Commentator Proposals

Given the disadvantages and failures of existing and proposed legal
mechanisms to cover information products, it is not surprising that
commentators have embraced the task of either proposing new solutions
or, if not providing a solution, at least discussing the factors of a
successful proposal. 157 Unfortunately, most of the academic proposals
approach the problem of protection for information products by only
addressing one type of work; for example, only software or only
databases. Further, even in their limited scope, the proposals still
embody many of the disadvantages noted above for the existing
schemes, and thus none represent a favorable solution for protecting
information products.
Some commentators propose implementing protection through
modifications to existing intellectual property regimes or utilization of
alternate areas of current law. For example, Michael Steven Green
argues that by reexamining how we think about copyright, and
particularly the originality requirement and the idea/expression
dichotomy, there is room to cover "collective facts" or compiled data. 15 8

156 The 108th Congress actually proposed two bills: the Database and Collections of
Information Misappropriation Act, H.R. 3261, 108th Cong. (2003), and the Consumer Access to
Information Act of 2004, H.R. 3872, 108th Cong. (2004). The key feature of House Bill 3261
was its basis in misappropriation law. Infringement would have consisted of making available in
commerce a quantitatively substantial portion of the information contained in a database, if" I)
the database was generated, gathered, or maintained through a substantial expenditure of financial
resources or time, 2) the unauthorized making available in commerce occurs in a time sensitive
manner and inflicts injury on the database or [related products or services]," and 3) the ability to
free ride would lessen the incentive to create the database initially. These elements are not unlike
the elements created in the INS v. AP case described above-again with the focus on the timesensitive nature of the included data. The bill also included significant exceptions, similar to fair
use. House Bill 3872 was also based on misappropriation and followed a "hot news" type model.
157 This list is merely exemplary; there are far too many articles on this topic, with new pieces
being added frequently, to list them all here. See, e.g., Gibson, supra note 61; Greenbaum, supra
note 131; Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 3; Gervais, supra note 136; Jane C. Ginsburg,
Copyright, Common Law, and Sui Generis Protection of Databases in the United States and
Abroad, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 151 (1997); Amol Pachnanda, Scientific Databases Should Be
Protected Under a Sui Generis Regime, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 219 (2003).
158 Michael Steven Green, Copyrighting Facts, 78 IND. L.J. 919,957-63 (2003).
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Stacey Dogan and Joseph Liu argue that courts can, and indeed have,
been applying copyright law in a manner that allows protection of
software information products. 15 9 Dov Greenbaum suggests an alternate
structure to aid in protecting databases-the databank. 160 A databank
would be a simple depository of information to be used for scientific
research and ineligible for protection; a database, by comparison, is a
highly organized data structure that provides tools for analyzing the data
and should be eligible for protection under a modified copyright
protection scheme. 161 Daryl Lim suggests that antitrust law can be used
to limit access to and use of databases without altering the current
intellectual property regimes. 162
Many influential commentators have proposed sui generis
protection schemes for different sorts of information products. Jane
Ginsburg, Pamela Samuelson, and Jerome Reichman have all proposed
a new right of protection for database-type information products. 163
Pamela Samuelson and Peter Menell have proposed sui generis
Other
protection for software-type information products. 164
commentators, such as Dan Burk and Charles McManis, have argued
for sui generis protection for alternative information products like
genetic sequences and traditional knowledge.I65
Still other commentators, although avoiding proposing a solution
to the problem of protection for information products, have provided
suggestions for shaping a new regime or altering an existing regime to
cover these works. For example, Jim Gibson argues that any workable
solution should exploit the technological architecture surrounding
databases, regulating the extent to which developers can impose
architectural restraints that limit access, which can further be buttressed
Jacqueline Lipton proposes
by "technolegical" measures. 166
159 See Stacey L. Dogan & Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law & Subject Matter Specificity: The
Case of Computer Software, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 203,206 (2005) ("Courts have, on the
whole, successfully adapted copyright doctrines in a way that respects the underlying copyright
policies, as applied to the unique aspects of computer software.").
160 See Greenbaum, supra note 131, at 500.
161 See id.
162 See Daryl Lim Tze Wei, Regulating Access to Databases Through Antitrust Law: A
Missing Perspective in the Database Debate, 2006 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 7, 8, 30-60 (2006).
163 See Ginsburg, supra note 157, at 171-76 (proposing sui generis protection for databases);
Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 3, at 64-109 (1997) (same).
164 See PeterS. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 STAN. L. REV.
1329 (1987) (proposing sui generis protection for software); Samuelson et al., supra note 64, at
2332-2431 (1994) (same).
165 See Dan L. Burk, Copyrightability of Recombinant DNA Sequences, 29 JUR1METRICS J. 469
(1989) (proposing a copyright-like protection scheme for biotechnology inventions); Charles R.
McManis, Thinking Globally, Acting Locally, II CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 547, 563 (2003)
(discussing sui generis protection for traditional knowledge); see also S. Benjamin Pleune,
Trouble with the Guidelines: On Urging the PTO to Properly Evolve with Novel Technologies,
2001 J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 365 (200 I) (proposing DNA-specific sui generis legislation).
166 See Gibson, supra note 61, at 189-90.
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reconceptualizing the protection of information products as a system of
property rights and responsibilities. 167 Her system envisions balancing
the competing interests of information products creators and the public
through the imposition of significant legal duties on information
property rights holders, including obligations such as facilitating
scientific, technical, or educational use of the information; ensuring the
accuracy and accessibility of personal information; and protecting
cultural rights. 168
As discussed above, current means available for protecting
information products either result in under-protection, depriving the
creator of the work the opportunity to recoup the resources invested in
the development of the product, or over-protection, keeping information
that would otherwise be available to the public from being accessed or
used. In the very worst cases, both under-protection and overprotection may occur. For example, in the case of a database consisting
mostly of facts that the creator has attempted to cover by contract law,
his level of protection may be insufficient if a third-party obtains a copy
of the database because of privity issues in contract. Yet, through the
use of this very same contract, the creator may limit access to and use of
mere facts that would otherwise be unprotectable. While the numerous
articles and proposals for new or improved protection for information
products clearly demonstrates the need, none address the dual concern
of providing adequate protection while maintaining a free flow of
information.

Ill.

PROTECTING AND FACILITATING TRANSACTIONS IN INFORMATION
PRODUCTS

Despite the best intentions to keep information "free" by denying
protection under traditional intellectual property regimes, the reality is
that an improved protection scheme is necessary to truly facilitate
information flow. I propose a sui generis protection scheme for
information products that defines clear rights and boundaries, aimed at
clarifying the rights of the creator of the work while also facilitating
transactions in the information, both with an eye towards encouraging
the free flow of information. My proposal focuses on the overall work
(both the information and structural components) and, unlike many
academic and legislative proposals, is applicable to multiple types of
information products. Many of the objections to the protection of
information are based on the idea that we do not want "information"

167 See Lipton, supra note II, at 165.
168 See id. at 172-73.

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

2130

[Vol. 30:5

itself to be protected; that is, we are against the protection of the
information as the "thing." This is the essence of propertization or
commodification of information. My proposal instead seeks to provide
the protection necessary to encourage the development of information
products while being conscious of the concerns that are raised when
information is propertized. The main tenet of my proposal is that
information should be protected not as the "thing," but rather as a
component of the "thing." Thus, the "thing" being protected is the
information product as a whole, which consists of both a structural
component and an information component. In doing so, I aim to
provide a better definition of precisely when information qua
information products will be protected. I also center this proposal
largely on a liability-type regime, which, along with the clarified
boundaries of protection, should encourage transactions in information
and information products and, at bottom, the flow of information.
In this Part, I will explain the essential features of how my
proposed system of protection works. Next, I will explore the hallmarks
of any viable protection scheme and explain why my system fits within
this rubric. Finally, I will explain how my system is different from the
previously discussed available protection schemes and proposals and
how my system avoids the pitfalls in which those schemes and
proposals squarely fall.

A.

Proposed System of Protection for Information Products

In order to provide improved protection for information products
while still facilitating the free flow of information, I propose a system
that better defines the scope of coverage for a wide range of information
products
and
incorporates
liability-type
rules;
these
two
improvements-clarifying the boundaries of protection and altering the
remedies available-should, when taken together, ease the concerns
about enclosure and even facilitate the flow of information. The
coverage is tailored to protect not simply data, which offends the notion
that information should be free; rather the system covers only data that
has enhanced value based on the added structural component.
1.

Components

The information products contemplated to be covered by this
proposal are those that include both an information component and a
structural component. A component is commonly defined as "a
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constituent part." 169
In the technical arts, such as software,
componentization is defined as breaking a system into interchangeable
parts, each of which encapsulate a portion of functionality. 17 0 Applying
this idea of componentization to information products, consider a work
where the information component can be interchanged and where the
structural component organizes the information component, gives the
information component context and meaning, and facilitates distribution
of the information component. A simple example of this idea is a
database of telephone listings. One information component may consist
of telephone listings from Richmond, Virginia, housed within a
structural component of a database that has fields for full name, address,
and phone numbers. I can easily interchange the above information
component of listings from Richmond with those from, for example,
Marion, Illinois. The same structural component still provides the
context, but the information component that provides the real functional
data is interchangeable. However, it is possible too to conceive of a
different structural component, perhaps with fields for only last names
and phone numbers, in which the same information components may be
used.
The components of the information component are
interchangeable in this respect as well. This notion of components and
interchangeability can be extrapolated to cover every type of
information product for which this system may be used.
Although the composition of information components may vary
across the spectrum of information products, there is some information
that would not fit within this scheme. Simple information about a
tangible (or even intangible) item or information resulting from a
process would be unlikely to fall into the category of information
product to be protected under this scheme. For example, the census
population of Richmond would not be an information component.
However, information that would not, by itself, constitute an
information component can, in relation to other pieces of information
and within a viable structural component, become an information
component. 171 If I were instead to create an information component
comprising all of the cities and towns in Virginia, along with their
census populations, and put it in a structural component with relevant
fields, the census population of Richmond might then become one
portion or entry of the information component. This introduces the
further notion of the information component as combinable-that is, the
169 Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437,449 n.ll (2007) (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 466 ( 1981 )).
I70 See, e.g., DEFINE MEANING OF COMPONENTIZA TION, http://looselycoupled.com/glossary/
componentization (last visited Mar. I 0, 2008).
I71 This idea is not dissimilar from Michael Steven Green's idea of protection for "collective
facts." See Green, supra note 158. However, I do not believe, as Green does, that copyright law
is the best avenue for covering collective facts, and thus propose a sui generis system.
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information should be able to be combined with other information or
components.m It is not simply because it is a bare fact that the census
population of Richmond is not an information component; on its own, it
is also not combinable with other components. Even information that is
quite detailed (unlike a census number) can fall outside the notion of an
information component. For example, instructions for building a device
would not likely be an information component, because even though
detailed, it could not be combined with other components nor could it
be interchangeable with other components.m
Many types of information products may include both an
information component and a structural component and thus will be
eligible for coverage under the proposed scheme. Two information
products for which the system has immediately recognizable
applicability are databases and software; however, the system is also
potentially applicable to the protection of other existing information
products.
a.

Databases

Databases are the most natural type of information products to
envision in the proposed protection scheme. Originally a military term,
databases were defined as "collections of data shared by end-users of
[a] ... computer system." 174 Now the term has been expanded to refer
to any compilation of data that is typically organized and utilized via a
database management system, providing a bridge between the data and
the end user. 175 The information component of the database, literally
the data, is organized by the structural component, the fields of the
database, which also give context and meaning to the information
component. The structural component further facilitates distribution of
the data, or information component, in a useful fashion.
b.
Software

IS

Software

slightly more difficult to envision as an information

172 See Microsoft Corp., 550 U.S. at 740 (discussing the difference between simple
information, such as a blueprint, and information which can be combined with other components,
such as software).
173 See id.
174 See Greenbaum, supra note 131, at 441 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
175 See id. Although most databases today are electronic, printed databases could also be
covered by this proposal. "[A] database is [simply] an organized and indexed collection of
information that allows users to access and organize heterogeneous data in an efficient fashion."
!d.
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product, in part because software is difficult to define or classify . 176
One definition of software is "a set of instructions: not mere knowledge,
but a certain arrangement of matter that makes a computer perform." 177
Working from this definition, the information component of software is
the set of instructions. The structural component is then the particular
arrangement of those instructions that organizes the instructions,
provides context and meaning to the instructions as the organization or
arrangement is the basis for the instructions to cause the computer to
behave in a certain fashion, 178 and facilitates the distribution of the
instructions or information component.
c.

Additional Information Products

While databases and software provide the simplest examples of
information products that would be eligible for protection under this
proposal, there are other works that both have an information
component and a structural component. Some examples include genetic
sequence inventions, geo-spatial data, real estate appraisal systems, and
certain types of indigenous knowledge. Many of these works have been
likened to specialized forms of databases, where the information
component is given value by virtue of the organization provided by the
structural component. 179 These products can be characterized in this
176 One of the difficulties in classifYing software as an information product may be that, unlike
databases, software can be and has been viewed in multiple ways. Although not a perfect
analogy, the Supreme Court recently observed:
Software, the 'set of instructions, known as code, that directs a computer to perform
specified functions or operations,' can be conceptualized in (at least) two ways. One
can speak of software in the abstract: the instructions themselves detached from any
medium. (An analogy: The notes of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony.) One can
alternatively envision a tangible 'copy' of software, the instructions encoded on a
medium such as a CD-ROM. (Sheet music for Beethoven's Ninth.)
Microsoft Corp., 550 U.S. at 447 (quoting Fantasy Sports Props., Inc. v. Sportsline.com, Inc., 287
F.3d 1108, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
177 See Margaret Jane Radin, Information Tangibility, in ECONOMICS, LAW & INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: SEEKING STRATEGIES FOR RESEARCH AND TEACHING IN A DEVELOPING FIELD 395,
402-03 (2003).
178 See Pamela Samuelson et a!., supra note 64, at 2316.
179 See, e.g., Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 3, at 135 ("Conceivably, ... genetically
engineered life forms could also fall within the broad definition of database in that they are
'assemblies ... of ... materials arranged in a methodical or systematic way."'); Eisenberg, supra
note 10 (likening genetic sequence inventions to scientific information, rather than chemical
entities); Katleen Janssen & Jos Dumortier, The Protection of Maps and Spatial Databases in
Europe and the United States by Copyright and the Sui Generis Right, 24 1. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 195 (2006); Bradford S. Simon, Intellectual Property and Traditional
Knowledge: A Psychological Approach to Conflicting Claims of Creativity in International Law,
20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1613 (2005); Posting of Eric Goldman to Concurring Opinions,
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2007 /0 1/real_estate_app.htrnl (Jan. 8, 2007, 23:59
EST).
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manner, and so long as they have identifiable information and structural
components as defined above, they too would fall within the proposed
scheme.
2.

How Does the Proposed Scheme Work?

The two most important aspects of the proposed scheme are that a
creator's rights in the information product are clearly defined and that
the system is based largely on liability, rather than property type
rules. 18° First, clearly defined rights are important to encourage creators
of information products to make the necessary investment in developing
their product, but also to facilitate transactions in information and
information products. As economists note, the purpose of a property
regime is to "ensure that resources are allocated to their highest valued
use" in order to increase monetary reward and, to achieve this goal, the
system must clearly define property rights. 181 The clearly defined rights
then facilitate for private bargaining, 182 permitting parties to effectively
negotiate for use of and access to the information product on the basis
of perceived value. As the law currently stands, it is unclear what
rights, if any, a creator has in any given information product, which
makes bargaining impossible and thereby inhibits transactions in
information products and the underlying information.
Second, a key feature of the proposed system is that much
infringing behavior is viewed from a liability-type perspective. It may
seem counterintuitive, after advocating above for clearly defined
property rights, to propose that a system that relies, at least in part, on
liability rules. However, that rights are available for information
products has been clarified by this system. Also, there are regularly
substitutions of fuzzy, ambiguous rules for clear entitlements, even in
property-type systems. 183 In fact, at least one commentator has argued
that "muddy rules" will encourage bargaining where transaction costs
are high, for example on the Internet. 184 The proposed system defines
180 The difference between "property rules" and "liability rules" was elucidated by Guido
Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed in their seminal work on this topic, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). Under a
property rule, the owner has the right to exclude others; under a liability rule, the owner has no
right to exclude but can demand compensation or damages. See id. at II 05-06.
181 Christine D. Galbraith, A Panoptic Approach to Information Policy: Utilizing a More

Balanced Theory of Property in Order to Ensure the Existence of a Prodigious Public Domain,
15 J. INTELL. PROP. L. I, 33 (2007) (citation omitted).
182 See id.; Siebrasse, supra note 13, at 56-57.
183 See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REv. 577, 578
(1988).
184 See Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REv. 121, 138 ( 1999).
Other commentators have also noted that property rules may be more efficient where borders are
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the outer extents of protection available, but leaves the details to a
"muddy," liability-type analysis in order to facilitate transactions and
allow for the flexibility required to avoid concerns about propertizing
information. Iss
One way to view the liability-type regime is to consider that
potentially infringing behavior resides on a spectrum. In property law,
the inquiry is typically binary: Is there trespass or not? 186 Instead, for
the protection of information products, the real analysis should question
how bad the offending behavior was. At one end of the spectrum, there
is no protection for the information component separate from the
structural component. This means that there is no liability for simply
possessing the information. There is also no liability where the
information component has been reverse engineered or independently
created. At the other end of the spectrum, there is full coverage for
infringement via unauthorized access or appropriation of the entire
information product, consisting of both the information component and
the structural component. Because the information product as a whole
has been taken, this is better treated under a property-type regime and
the system contemplates injunction as a potential remedy for this.
The more difficult inquiry occurs when something less than the
whole is taken, and this is where the liability-type rules will be used.
For a concrete example, consider a database that includes the names of
all of the law professors that teach at law schools in the United States,
their contact information, and their areas of teaching and research. 187
This database would most likely fail to be protected under copyright
law, because its selection of data is not unique (all law professors are
included) and because its arrangement is obvious (for example, by law
fuzzy. See Richard Epstein, Transaction Costs and Property Rights: Or, Do Good Fences Make
Good Neighbors? 6-7 (Chicago Working Papers in Law & Economics, 2d Series) (March 1996).
185 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 180 (suggesting that liability rules may be preferable
where transaction costs are high, such that a party who places high value on the work can simply
take it and compensate the owner for the loss); Burk, supra note 184, at 140 ("More often, the
uncertainty created by the muddy standard tends to channel buyers and sellers into less costly
informal structures."). This idea is controversial and has won both supporters and detractors.
Compare Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to
Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1995) with Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Do
Liability Rules Facilitate Bargaining? A Reply to Ayres and Talley, 105 YALE L.J. 221 (1995);
and Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules versus Liability Rules: An Economic
Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996).
186 To be sure, there is some "muddiness" even in this simple inquiry. Dan Burk explains this
using the common idea of tying a boat up to a dock. Normally, permission from the dock owner
is required and the dock owner is free to exclude others from tying up their boats. However, in
the case of a deadly storm or other exigent circumstances, a sailor may tie up to a dock without
permission and will simply be liable for any damages incurred, thus turning the simple question
of trespass into a liability inquiry. See Burk, supra note 184, at 127-28.
187 Such a database is maintained by the American Association of Law Schools (AALS) and is
See AALS Directory of Law Teachers DLT,
generally protected via contract law.
http://www.aals.org/services_directory.php (last visited Mar. 2, 2009).
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school or by subject matter taught). Under the proposed protection
scheme, however, this database would fare better. Because the
information component is not independently protectable and reverseengineering is permitted, I can-should I wish-go to every law
school's website and gather up this information on my own, without
incurring any liability for possessing or using the information thereafter.
On the flipside, I can not copy wholesale the database (either in print or
electronic form), as this would be taking the whole information product,
both the information component and the structural component. In that
case, I would be subject to traditional property remedies, including an
injunction if appropriate.
What is the result, however, if I merely take a portion of the
database-if I copy only the information component related to
intellectual property professors in the structural framework? Or if I
only take a portion of the structural framework, such as only some of
the fields, and all of the information contained therein-for example, if
I take only the names and e-mail addresses of all of the professors in the
database? What if I am merely using the database to verify a single
fact? 188 These situations are where a liability-type regime provides the
appropriate response. Where portions of the information component
and framework have been taken, the remedy will not be an injunction,
but rather a system of damages to compensate the creator of the
information product. As with many liability regimes, the amount of
damages will be determined by looking at a number of factors, such as
how much of the information product was taken, the reason the
information product was taken, the relationship between the creator of
the information product and the party who took the information without
consent, and the effect of the taking on the market for the original
information product. 189 The effect of this inquiry will be to permit free
or cheap access to portions of an information component within one of
these works subject to the value the information has to the user, permit
access to the information components in cases of good reason (such as
educational investigation or research), and permit the creation of new
inventions (both traditional and information products) so long as the
effect is not to take away from the market for the original information
188 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL COMMITTEE FOR A STUDY ON PROMOTING ACCESS
TO SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DATA FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST, A QUESTION OF BALANCE:
PRIVATE RIGHTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DATABASES 34

(1999) (distinguishing using a database as an end user-to verity a fact or perform a personal

task-versus using a database for a derivative use, which "builds on a preexisting database and
includes at least one, and frequently many more, extractions from one or more databases to create
a new database").
I89 In these instances, where portions of an information product are taken, it is important to
remember that the value of information is not simply related to the quantity of information taken,
but the value in being able to obtain the necessary information quickly, without having to do the
searching and gathering. See Gervais, supra note 136, at 1159-60.
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product.
The benefits of this scheme are clear. The creator of the
information product benefits from an artificial lead-time in which to try
to recover his development investment, but others can effectively make
a decision about what and whether it is worth for them to use the
information. Thus, if the information is necessary for innovation in
another field, it will be available for some cost; if the information
product is simply being taken to compete with the original information
product, it will be unavailable or available at an inflated cost. Because
of the factors that are considered in determining the cost for the
transactions (liability damages), there is an element of fair use that
protects innocent and de minimis users, as well as educational and
research users. The scheme is dynamic, is not tied to any one
information product, is not tied to any particular technology, and most
importantly, encourages bargaining outside of the legal system. The
owner of the information product has the incentive to bargain, because
only in the face of complete, wholesale infringement is there going to be
injunctive relief-there is no benefit to acting as a hold-out. Further,
the user wishing to access and use the information product has an
incentive to bargain, because the boundaries of the protection covering
the information product are going to be more clearly defined than those
that exist today.
Most uses of the information component and
information product are going to result simply in monetary remedies
and thus a priori negotiations are in all parties' best interests.
One criticism raised with respect to this proposal is that all
information is currently available for a cost, so it is unlikely that this
proposal will result in increased bargaining or negotiation between the
information product creator and the user desiring access. However, at
least anecdotally, there is evidence that information product creators do
not always behave in a rational manner and readily deny access to
information, even when a reasonable price has been offered. 19o This
proposal addresses this problem by prohibiting the creator of
information products to hold-out against an offer; if the creator chooses
to deny access, a party wanting to use the information product can
always simply misappropriate the product and pay damages later.

B.

What Makes a Good Protection Scheme and Why This Proposal Is
One
In addition to the benefits explained above that largely relate to the

190 See. e.g., Burk, supra note 184, at 158 ("One might expect serious 'holdout' problems to
arise in [the informational goods] environment, as every copyright holder attempts to capture the
full value of every use of his works.").
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incentives and behaviors of the creators and users of information
products, there are advantages to this scheme that go beyond simply the
involved parties. First, the proposal provides more complete and robust
protection for both existing and future developed information products,
because the system approaches and protects these works categorically,
rather than individually. Second, because the proposal is a sui generis
proposal and is shaped from scratch with the specified goals of
providing coverage while encouraging information flow, the scheme
also permits more robust coverage than simply stretching and straining
existing law to provide an ill-fit quick fix. Third, this proposal uses
liability-type rules that not only may improve negotiation between
creators and users, but may generally provide greater flexibility and
robustness, more access to information, and greater potential for
information flow for all.
First, this proposal covers multiple types of information products
that have received short shrift by existing intellectual property regimes.
Rather than excluding these works from coverage (either partially or
completely), this proposal embraces these works, particularly because
of their information component and the value added by the structural
component. The system then provides an appropriate level of protection
that advances both of the stated goals-providing the creator of the
work with an artificial lead-time to compensate the creator for his
investment in developing the information product, and facilitating
transactions in information products by providing a clear and uniform
boundary of coverage across these works while denying injunctive relief
that may inhibit information flow. This scheme is attractive in its
breadth and flexibility to cover a wide range of information products,
such as databases, software, genetic sequence information, geo-spatial
data sets, and others, including those not yet developed, rather than
reacting in a knee-jerk fashion to problems with coverage of one type of
information product or another, as has been the case previously. The
robustness of protection for yet developed information products further
provides an a priori level of coverage that may encourage creation of
many new types of information products and will facilitate transactions
because the parties will not need to go through the primary stage of
determining whether protection is available before negotiations ensue.
Second, some overarching benefits arise from the fact that the
scheme is a sui generis proposal, not a mere alteration of existing
regimes to allow information products to fit. To be sure, sui generis
systems are not ideal; implementing these systems may cause increased
transaction and information costs and are further difficult to address on
the international scale. 19 1 However, as noted above, the existing

191 See Davison, supra note 137, at 179; Dreyfuss, supra note 2, at 912-13.
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regimes are simply ill-equipped to cover information products, even
with modifications. If these systems were adapted to cover information
products, there would likely be too much legislative and judicial
baggage accompanying the new right and it is unlikely that an actual
advantage would be realized.
In an article written by then-Representative Robert Kastenmeier
and then-House Counsel Michael Remington, the authors explained
when sui generis protection is appropriate. 192 The test is fourfold, and
asks 1) whether the new right will fit harmoniously within the existing
legal framework without violating any basic tenets of law, 2) whether
the new right can be defined in a reasonably clear manner, 3) whether
there is a cost-benefit advantage to implementing the new right, and 4)
whether the new right will "enrich or enhance the aggregate public
domain."I93 The protection of information products proposed by this
article meets all four prongs of this test. The proposed protection fits
harmoniously within existing law, because currently there is little
protection for information products under intellectual property laws.
One of the main purposes of this proposal is to clearly define that there
is a right in information products. The cost-benefit advantage and the
enrichment of the public domain have been discussed above in
explaining how the proposal will actually facilitate the flow of
information beyond what is currently occurring under the various selfhelp remedies.
Sui generis legislation has been used in precisely these situations,
where there is a new technology that resides on the margins of
traditional technology and does not fit comfortably within traditional
intellectual property regimes. The most prominent of the sui generis
intellectual property-type regimes is the Semiconductor Chip Protection
Act of 1984 (Chip Act). 194 The Chip Act blended elements of patent
law and copyright law in an effort to more fully cover semiconductor
advances, while also being cognizant of some of the major concerns
about protecting innovation, such as protecting the public domain and
The Chip Act also rejects
permitting reverse-engineering. 195
compulsory licensing and protects innocent infringers. 196 Similarly,
other special purpose intellectual property laws have been enacted to
protect industrial designs and plant varieties, as well as other creations
that do not fit well within either the patent or copyright regime. 197 One
constant criticism of sui generis protection is that by the time the new
192 See Robert W. Kastenmeier & Michael J. Remington, The Semiconductor Chip Protection
Act of 1984: A Swamp or Firm Ground?, 70 MINN. L. REV. 417 (1985).
193 See id. at 440-42.
194 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (2006).
195 See Dreyfuss, supra note 2, at 906-07.
196 Seeid.at911.
197 See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 3, at 53.
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rights come to fruition, technology has advanced past the point of being
protected. 198 However, by addressing information products as a broad
category with similar features, this proposal seeks to avoid premature
obsolescence and should cover yet-developed information products with
no alteration to the system.
Third, the proposed protection scheme achieves many advantages
because it is not entirely founded on property rules, but rather a mixture
of property and liability rules depending on the extent of infringing
behavior. There are essentially two ways in which information can be
protected-either under a property rule or under a liability rule. 199
Generally, as noted above, property rules provide for the creation of
exclusive rights and the possibility of injunctive relief, while liability
rules do not create definitive exclusion and instead provide for payment
of money damages for non-consensual or unauthorized access. 200 Mark
Lemley and Philip Weiser have provided a framework to determine
which remedial scheme (property or liability) is appropriate based on
whether injunctive relief against an infringer would over-compensate
the plaintiff and over-deter the defendants. 201
When such overcompensation and over-deterrence occur, the protection should follow a
liability scheme. 2o2 Clearly this is analogous to the problematic
situation that arises with most self-help means taken by information
product creators-the creator is able to appropriate more than he is
entitled to and, because of this, potential users of the information are
unnecessarily inhibited. As Lemley and Weiser explain, at the remedial
stage, over-compensation of the plaintiff and over-deterrence of the
defendant often arises when a court cannot easily tailor an injunction to
forbid only the prohibited conduct. 203 In the case of information
products, this difficulty in crafting relief of appropriate scope nearly
always arises; denominating a clear scope of a property right is virtually
impossible in the information products arena. 204 The proposed system,
198 See Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-institutional Approach to Patent
System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1128 (2003) ("The Semiconductor Chip Protection
Act, which sets up a sui generis regime of intellectual property protection for chips, was
superseded by new technology soon after its creation."); A. Samuel Oddi, An Uneasier Case for
Copyright than for Patent Protection of Computer Programs, 72 NEB. L. REV. 351,450-51 (1993)
(noting that the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act was made obsolete by advances in
technology even before it was enacted); Suzanna Sherry, Haste Makes Waste: Congress and the
Common Law in Cyberspace, 55 VAND. L. REV. 309, 310-17 (2002) (making the same argument
with respect to the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act and the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act).
199 Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules
Govern
Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 783-84 (2007).
200 !d. at 786.
201 See id. at 784.
202 See id.
203 See id. at 785.
204 See id. at 794. This should not be confused with the clarification that a property right
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in embracing a largely liability-type regime, avoids this systematic
overcompensation but still encourages the creation of these works by
providing more certain protection than is currently offered.
There are additional benefits of applying a liability regime to the
protection of information products. One main reason is that information
simply does not have the attributes that generally characterize property;
information is a public, not private, good. 205 Information is both nonrivalrous, meaning one can enjoy the good without depleting another's
ability to also do so, and non-excludable, meaning that once the good is
made public, the creator can no longer easily control its use. 206 If we
were to award a property right in an information product, we would be
artificially creating a rivalry and excludability that did not previously
exist. These artificial limitations drive some of the arguments against
protecting information products, as information should not be made
scarce or inaccessible; we want to encourage the flow of information, as
well as the creation of information products. A liability regime avoids
these property issues by acknowledging that many can use information
products without causing depletion. Further, liability regimes allow for
greater flexibility, and so may be more palatable than property regimes
when we are concerned with permitting access to information to avoid
stifling innovation. Finally, regarding feasibility, Congress has already
approved limited use of liability rules in intellectual property, for
example, with the use of compulsory licenses in copyright law. 207 Thus,
because liability rules are appropriate for covering information products
because of their nature, because of the flexibility in application, and
because of familiarity with this type of remedy, the proposed system
rests on firm ground.
Of course, adopting a liability-type regime does not come without
difficulties. The effectiveness of any liability rule will depend on the
complexity of that rule, which in tum is going to require an inquiry into
the extent to which the good is non-rivalrous and enjoyed by many
without depletion, as well as the ability of a court or regulatory body to
access information necessary to make determinations. 20 8 The liability
rules must be clearly defined and appropriately limited so that the
underlying incentives are not undermined; 209 the precise liability rules
to implement this system are fact dependent and outside the scope of
this paper. However, so long as the rules implemented minimize
opportunistic rent-seeking, avoid distorting the marketplace based on
exists in information products, which is the certainty that is required to encourage transactions in
information.
205 See Lipton, supra note 11, at 140-4 L
206 See Gibson, supra note 61, at 173.
207 See Lemley & Weiser, supra note 199, at 825.
208 See id. at 809.
209 See id. at 813.
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technological differences, and encourage private bargaining, 210 the goals
of this proposed system should be realized. For these reasons, the
advantages of this proposed scheme for protecting information products
should extend far beyond just providing better coverage for information
product creators and better bargaining between creators and potential
users of the works.
C.

How the Proposed System Avoids the Pitfalls of Current Schemes
and Earlier Proposals

The insufficiencies of the earlier proposed schemes to address
protection of information products, as well as the currently used
alternative legal and non-legal mechanisms, can likely be attributed to a
few related notions that this proposal seeks to avoid. First, those
schemes are primarily based on property notions, which may not be the
best fit for information products. Second, those schemes were not
designed with the aim of facilitating transactions in information, which
must be a key constituent of any scheme that runs the risk of
propertizing information. Third, none of these schemes recognize the
commonalities inherent in the variety of potential information products
that would make a uniform scheme a better, more robust option, and
thus do not avoid a usual concern with sui generis protection.
First, many of the proposed and implemented protection
mechanisms developed for information products fail, in part, because
they are typically centered on a property-based scheme. Because
information is not tangible, applying traditional property rules often
results in an uneasy fit. 211 In fact, the problem is not just that
information products are not properly categorized as property, rather
"these new information products present difficult conceptual problems
that render them unamenable to intellectual property protection under
traditional regimes .... " 212 Moving from a property regime to more of
a liability regime would provide greater flexibility and likely be less
offensive, and thus represent an improvement over existing and
proposed protection schemes. 213

210 See id. at 829 (discussing the hallmarks of a good liability rule, based on copyright's
compulsory license provision). See also Davison, supra note 137, at 181-184, for additional
features required for effective database protection, and Samuelson, et al., supra note 64, at 2412,
for essential components of effective software protection.
211 Dreyfuss, supra note 2, at 898.
212 !d.
213 To be sure, there have been some liability-type regimes proposed, such as the bills raised
by the I 08th Congress, see supra note !56 and accompanying text, and a modified liability
regime offered by Jerome Reichman and Pamela Samuelson for the protection of databases. See
Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 3, at 145. However, the vast majority of schemes rely on
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Second, these schemes are not designed with the goal of
facilitating transactions in information. Although the importance of
information flow is of general concern in today's society, one of the
biggest objections to protecting information products is the perceived
effect of protection on scientific and educational access to information
products. These users:
would arguably fare better either under a simple unfair competition
law that prohibited gross copying or under a sui generis regime built
on more refined liability principles than under the regimes based on
exclusive property rights. A liability model would create no legal
barriers to entry in its own right, nor need it significantly strengthen
the sole-source data provider's market power. On the contrary, a
properly crafted liability regime stimulates competition both through
lead-time incentives to invest and through an automatic
license .... 214

Thus, any protection system that combines these first two
concerns-that is, any property-based scheme with no thought given to
facilitating transactions-is doomed to fail.
Third, none of the above schemes recognize just how similar many
types of information products are, and importantly, that the areas of
concern in protecting each are the same. Despite the efforts of
legislators and commentators to propose amendments to existing
regimes, these too fail because they are isolated to a particular type of
information product, do not focus on the aspects associated with the
facilitation of transactions, and do not address the information
component, where the work's primary value lies. In developing a
scheme that is flexible enough to cover the existing information
products (as well as any future information products that include an
information component), the resulting system will be more robust and
Jess reactionary. Further a scheme that is centered on the idea of an
information component will both ease transactions in information and
secure the valuable portion of the work.
Finally, despite all of the advantages, I do acknowledge that there
are some questions that have not been fully resolved by the analysis in
this Article.
One common concern with sui generis protection
proposals, particularly those that abut the coverage provided by patent
and copyright Jaws, is whether these schemes are constitutional.
Although scholars have come out on both sides of this issue, 215 the
property-type enclosures of information, which is not favorable.
214 Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 3, at !54.
215 See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 12; Yochai Benkler, The Role of Judicial Review in the
Creation and Definition of Private Rights in Information, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535 (2000);
Malia Pollack, The Right to Know?: Delimiting Database Protection at the Juncture of the
Commerce Clause, the Intellectual Property Clause, and the First Amendment, 17 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 47 ( 1999); Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 3.
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debate is beyond the scope of this paper and I rely on Justin Hughes'
article that concludes that, indeed, protection for information products
outside of the constitutionally scripted protections are permissible. 21 6 In
particular, Hughes suggests that protection for information products
(and specifically databases) can pass constitutional muster if the true
focus is on competitors, if there is fair use co-extensive with copyright
law, if the problems associated with sole source products are avoided, if
the rights actually expire, and if liability is limited to civil liability
(among other provisions).2 17 The proposal provided above meets these
criteria.
Another concern is the interaction between the proposed system
and existing alternative legal and non-legal mechanisms. Based on how
this same question is treated with respect to current intellectual property
regimes, there seem to be two approaches. Patent law forbids a patent
holder from attempting to expand his monopoly beyond that granted by
the patent under the doctrine of patent misuse.m Copyright, on the
other hand, appears to permit the copyright owner to extend the scope of
his rights, as is true when digital rights technology is used in
conjunction with copyrighted works.m Given the primary concern of
facilitating information flow, a misuse theory may prove useful in the
information products protection arena to prohibit the rights holder from
attempting to expand his rights using these alternative means.
However, the details of such a misuse provision are also beyond the
scope of this paper.

CONCLUSION

While legislators and commentators debate whether information
products should be protected, creators of these works are seeking selfhelp coverage for the information products under a panoply of
alternative legal and non-legal mechanisms.
This results in the
simultaneous under-protection of information products, to the detriment
of the creator, and over-protection of these products, which inhibits
216 See Hughes, supra note 12; see also Gervais, supra note 136, at 1146 ("[So long as it were
anchored in the commerce clause], it remains unclear whether a federal misappropriation tort for
databases would necessarily be wholly unconstitutional.").
217 See Hughes, supra note 12, at 209-13.
218 The doctrine of patent misuse was first clearly defined in Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger
Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942). The Morton Salt case based its reasoning on the policy behind patent
law. !d. at 492. The doctrine of patent misuse has been narrowed in recent years and may not
prove as useful in reining in patent holders. See lllinois Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547
u.s. 28, 42-43 (2006).
219 Copyright law has also entertained a misuse theory, although it is not well known and is
less developed than patent misuse. See, e.g., Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970,
976 (4th Cir. 1990).
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information flow. Yet preserving the free flow of information is
precisely why intellectual property protection has traditionally not been
offered for these works.
This Article proposes a sui generis protection scheme that seeks to
address these issues of under-protection and over-protection. The
proposed system clarifies that rights are available in information
products, which should both provide incentives for increased creation of
these works and should facilitate transactions in these works (and the
underlying information). The system, however, is also flexible, relying
on liability-type remedies for most types of infringement to keep
information freely flowing. This too should encourage negotiations and
transactions for these products because injunctive relief will rarely be
available. Denying protection for information products does not ensure
that information is free. In fact, the opposite seems to be true;
information may want to be free, but information products do not.

